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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze creative accounting by fiscal adjust-
ments in Japanese municipalities after the introduction of a new fiscal rule us-
ing a seemingly unrelated regression with the difference in differences method.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing the interdependency of new fiscal
indexes, which include three flow indexes and one stock index, and identifying
the causal effects of the new fiscal rule. In addition, we focus on both the
”targeted indexes” and ”untargeted indexes” of the new fiscal rule because
some municipalities might take advantage of loopholes in the new fiscal rule to
improve their ”targeted indexes”. Our main contribution is the finding that
municipalities increase their money transfers to public enterprise accounts,
which is one of ”untargeted indexes”, after the introduction of the new fis-
cal rule to avoid the applicable punishments. This phenomenon is creative
accounting by fiscal adjustments because municipalities postpone improving
their true fiscal deficits.
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1 Introduction
Alesina and Perotti (1996) show that fiscal policy encouraging the issuance of gov-
ernment bonds tends to expand fiscal deficits due to political influences. They argue
that the expansion of the fiscal deficit is caused by a lack of specific fiscal rules or
the low transparency of budget institutions. Many studies show that a relationship
exists between fiscal rules and fiscal deficits and reveal that fiscal deficits are likely
to be small when fiscal rules are strict 1. However, some studies note that fiscal
deficits may increase when fiscal rules are suddenly changed, or the transparency of
the budget institution is decreased, even when fiscal rules are strict. Previous stud-
ies indicate that fiscal deficits could be reduced, which supports fiscal discipline
through the introduction of fiscal rules before budgets are drafted. In addition,
previous studies indicate that even if fiscal rules have a strong effect on improving
fiscal conditions, introducing overly strict fiscal rules may result in the use of fiscal
gimmicks. Milesi - Ferretti (2003) conduct a theoretical analysis suggesting that fis-
cal gimmicks can easily result when introducing fiscal rules under fiscal institutions
with low transparency.
Koen and van den Noord (2005) point out that fiscal gimmicks can be catego-
rized into two groups. The first group includes one-off measures that affect govern-
ment net lending or borrowing for a few years but not permanently. The second
group includes creative accounting measures that affect fiscal deficits or public debt
but not net worth. Von Hagen and Wolff (2006) define creative accounting as stock-
flow adjustments (SFA), where SFA = Bt-Bt−1-Dt, where Bt, and the debt level at
time t is the debt level from the previous year minus the current fiscal deficit, Dt.
These authors show that there is a tendency to increase accumulated debt when
the stock variables are higher than the increase in fiscal deficits. These results are
illustrated with flow variables using EU country data. Maltritz and Wu¨ste (2015)
show that there is an effect for fiscal rules and stock-flow adjustments using data
from 27 countries in the EU. The authors indicate that fiscal deficits are increased
by stock-flow adjustments. Cle´menceau and Soguel (2017) use Swiss canton-level
data to show that creative accounting is mainly implemented to hide surpluses.
Burret and Feld (2018a) investigate the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes
by using the difference in differences (DID) method. The results show that the
fiscal rule improved fiscal deficits in Swiss cantons, but cantonal debt brakes are
not related to substantial evasive measures. In contrast, Burret and Feld (2018b)
investigate the fiscal effects of Swiss cantonal debt brakes on municipal finance us-
ing the DID method. These scholars show that budget constraints at the cantonal
level have little effect on average municipal finances and fiscal decentralization.
Most previous studies on this topic are conducted using country- or state-level
data from places such as the US, the EU, the OECD, Latin American countries
and Swiss cantons 2. To the best of our knowledge, there have been few empirical
studies focused on creative accounting in local governments and even fewer that are
1Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1994), von Hagen and Harden (1995), Kontopoulos and Perotti
(1999), Persson and Tabellini (1999), Kirchgussner (2002), von Hagen (2006), Beetsma et al.
(2007), Debrun et al. (2008), Beetsma et al. (2009), Debrun et al. (2009), Luechinger and
Schaltegger (2013), Chatagny (2015).
2See Foremny(2014), Maltritz and Wu¨ste (2015), and Goto et al.(2017). As an example of
another perspective, Goto et al.(2017) empirically investigates whether creative accounting is em-
ployed when municipalities engage in negotiations for municipal mergers.
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based on municipal-level data after the introduction of new fiscal rules. Balduzzi
and Grembi (2011) empirically investigate creative accounting and focus on changes
in the fiscal rules of Italian municipalities in 2001 using the DID method. These
scholars show that municipalities in Italy were not affected by changes in the fiscal
rules. Using the difference in discontinuity method, Grembi et al. (2016) analyze
the fiscal rule of Italian municipalities that was relaxed for municipalities with fewer
than 5,000 inhabitants in 2001 and reveal that relaxing fiscal rules increases fiscal
deficits and lowers the tax receipts of Italian municipalities. Moreover, Alpino et
al. (2018) reveal that Italian municipalities rise local income taxes on middle- and
high-income earners but do not increase local income taxes for low incomes after
the introduction of a new population cutoff.
In this paper, we identify the causal effects of the new fiscal rule - called ”The
Law Relating to the Financial Soundness of Local Governments” [Chiho zaisei ken-
zenka ho in Japanese] - which focuses on creative accounting and reveals the inter-
dependency of the new fiscal indexes, by applying a seemingly unrelated regression
with the difference in differences (SUR-DID) method and using data from FY2007
to FY2010. The new fiscal rule introduces four fiscal indexes comprising three flow
indexes and one stock index. These new indexes target not only the general ac-
counts of each municipality but also those of extra-governmental organizations to
reveal the true fiscal conditions of all public sector entities. Before the introduction
of the new fiscal rule, the fiscal management of all municipalities has operated un-
der the former fiscal rule for approximately 50 years. However, because the former
fiscal rule included only two of the indexes relating to fiscal balances and targeting
general accounts, some municipalities were easily able to shift a portion of the fiscal
deficits in their general accounts to extra-governmental organizations to hide their
poor fiscal condition. The new fiscal rule was introduced in FY2007 to address this
problem.
We contribute to the literature in a number of ways. To reveal the true fiscal
conditions of each municipality, including extra-governmental organizations, it is
necessary to investigate the impacts of the new fiscal rule and determine whether
municipalities employ creative accounting through fiscal adjustments or stock-flow
adjustments. In addition to assessing previous studies on this topic, we analyze
the interdependency of four fiscal indexes to reveal creative accounting after the
implementation of the new fiscal rule. Thus, we apply the SUR-DID method, which
is a new approach for this type of study, for the following reasons.
First, we focus on the effects of the four new fiscal indexes that were employed
due to the introduction of the new fiscal rule in terms of creative accounting. From
a global perspective, this new fiscal rule in Japan is atypical because in many
countries, local governments introduce either balanced-budget or debt limit rules.
Previous studies investigate the effects of only one type of fiscal rule. However, the
new fiscal rule in Japan simultaneously adopts three flow indexes and one stock
index for municipalities. These three flow indexes have both ”yellow cards”, which
require municipalities to plan for early financial soundness, and ”red cards”, which
require municipalities to be under the control of the central government to rebuild
stable financial conditions. The stock index does not include a red card. Thus, some
municipalities that suffer from large fiscal deficits may have an incentive to engage
in creative accounting to avoid fiscal management under the supervision of the
central government. In other words, there is a possibility that these municipalities
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will decrease their flow indexes without increasing the stock index, which does not
include a red card. Moreover, the Japanese new fiscal rule is clearly different than
that of other countries. The new fiscal indexes target not only the general accounts
but also extra-governmental organizations. Another contribution of this study its
focus on extra-governmental organizations after the introduction of the new fiscal
rule. Thus, we consider creative accounting that may occur among all public sector
accounts.
Second, we also focus on the differences in the ”targeted indexes” and ”untar-
geted indexes” of the new fiscal rule. In this paper, ”targeted indexes” refer to the
new four fiscal indexes, and ”untargeted indexes” refer to the indexes of reserved
funds and money transfers. Even if it appears that municipalities improve their new
fiscal indexes, we must investigate whether they make fiscal adjustments without
breaking the new fiscal rule by decreasing the reserved funds or increasing money
transfers. For example, under the former fiscal rule, some municipalities hid the
fiscal deficits of extra-governmental organizations by decreasing their funds or in-
creasing the money transfers from general accounts to other accounts. Through this
behavior, municipalities can postpone improving their fiscal conditions. Therefore,
we focus not only on the ”targeted indexes” of the new fiscal rule but also on the
”untargeted indexes”, such as reserved funds and money transfers.
Third, the four new indexes of the new fiscal rule must be applied annually. If at
least one index exceeds the red card criterion, then the municipality will come under
the supervision of the central government. Thus, municipalities must simultane-
ously improve all indexes, except for the stock index, every year. In this case, when
we estimate these indexes as outcome variables, it is inappropriate to expect the
estimation equation error terms to be uncorrelated. Specifically, it is statistically
appropriate to use the contemporaneous error terms to address estimation biases
relating to the decisions of municipal fiscal management. Additionally, we consider
the fiscal relationships that exist in the public sector, such as general accounts, pub-
lic enterprise accounts, local public corporations, and third sector enterprises. Since
these indexes have contemporaneous cross-equation error correlations, we apply an
SUR model, which has not been previously used in this field.
Fourth, to identify the causal effects of the new fiscal rule, we apply a DID
method, which has been used in previous studies. In particular, we focus on the
institutional change between the partial enforcement in FY2007 and the total en-
forcement in FY2008 because the partial enforcement of the new fiscal rule does
not distribute any punishment even if municipalities exceed the criteria of the new
fiscal indexes. Some municipalities that suffer from a large former redemption or
a low former fiscal balance index might engage in creative accounting under the
new fiscal rule. For these reasons, in this paper, we combine SUR with the DID
method to identify the causal effects and reveal the interdependency of the new
fiscal indexes.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains Japan’s new fiscal rule.
Section 3 explains the empirical method that is used. Section 4 presents and dis-
cusses the results, and Section 5 concludes the paper.
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2 Institutional background and the new fiscal rule for
local governments in Japan
2.1 Institutional background
In this section, we briefly describe the institutional background of Japanese local
public finance and the new fiscal rule. Local governments play an important role in
providing many public services, including public education, welfare, public health,
fire services, public construction, and waste disposal.
In FY2007, gross domestic expenditures of Japan were 503 trillion Japanese yen.
Local public finances included 60 trillion Japanese yen, while the central government
budget was 21 trillion Japanese yen. That is, gross domestic expenditures were
approximately 5 trillion dollars at an exchange rate of 100 yen to one U.S. dollar.
Accordingly, local public finances represent 0.6 trillion dollars, and the central
government budget is 0.2 trillion dollars. The proportion of local public finances
relative to gross domestic expenditures was approximately 12 percent in FY2007,
which is approximately three times higher than that of the central government. In
addition, the central government has accumulated debts of approximately 6 trillion
dollars, and local governments have debts of approximately 2 trillion dollars.
The Japanese government includes a central government as well as prefectural
and municipal governments (ordinance-designated cities, core cities, special cities,
cities, towns, and villages). Ordinance-designated cities are those with a population
of 500,000 or more and are designated by a cabinet order under a special provision.
Such cities have nearly the same level of authority and financial resources as pre-
fectures. Core cities are those with a population size of at least 300,000, and part
of their authority is delegated by prefectures, although the scope of their authority
is smaller than that of ordinance-designated cities. Similarly, special case cities
are those with a population size of at least 200,000, and part of their authority
is delegated by prefectures, although the scope of their authority is smaller than
that of core cities. Cities are defined as having a population size of at least 50,000;
however, there is little or no difference in the authority of cities, towns, and villages.
Normally, in public finance, municipal accounts are divided into general ac-
counts and special accounts. Special accounts consist of public enterprise accounts,
such as those used for transport businesses, electricity businesses, gas businesses,
and residential land development projects. However, because each municipality
provides different services depending on the local conditions, there are different
types of special accounts. To compare the accounts of all municipalities uniformly,
the Japanese central government establishes ordinary accounts that cover general
accounts and a common component of special accounts. Thus, we can elucidate
the fiscal conditions of municipalities and conduct a statistical comparison among
municipalities using ordinary accounts and other public enterprise accounts.
Municipalities include some extra-governmental organizations, including partial
administrative associations, wide-area local public bodies, local public corporations,
and third-sector enterprises. Partial administrative associations and wide-area local
public bodies are extra-governmental organizations that cooperate with neighboring
municipalities to provide public services, including fire and rescue services, waste
removal services, and public long-term care insurance. Partial administrative as-
sociations provide a single service in cooperation with neighboring municipalities,
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whereas wide-area local public bodies provide multiple services in cooperation with
neighboring municipalities.
2.2 The new fiscal rule for local governments in Japan
To improve fiscal conditions and work towards a high level of transparency in fiscal
management, the central government enacted The Law Relating to the Financial
Soundness of Local Governments for local governments. This new fiscal rule was
enacted in June 2007 and includes four new fiscal indexes: three flow indexes and
one stock index. These new indexes target not only ordinary accounts in each
municipality but also extra-governmental organizations to reveal the true fiscal
condition of the public sector. Before the new fiscal rule was introduced, the fiscal
management of all municipalities had been conducted under the former rule for
approximately 50 years. Because the former rule included only two of the indexes as
targets, the index relating to fiscal balances and the redemption index of ordinary
accounts, some municipalities could easily shift a portion of the fiscal deficits of
their ordinary accounts to extra-governmental organizations to hide their poor fiscal
condition. For example, Yubari City in Hokkaido went practically bankrupt in 2007.
This event was, in fact, due to creative accounting between the ordinary accounts
and extra-governmental organizations, such as third sector enterprises. Because
Yubari City transferred large debts that they had to repay to other accounts, it
accumulated debt that was approximately 65 times larger than its tax revenue prior
to bankruptcy.
Fig. 1 shows the timeline for the introduction of the new fiscal rule. The new
fiscal rule was partially enforced in FY2007. Partial enforcement of the rule means
that the municipalities only had to disclose their new fiscal indexes in FY2007. That
is, municipalities did not receive any punishment even if their indexes exceeded the
criteria set by the new fiscal rule. However, since the settlement of the FY2008 fiscal
accounts, the new fiscal rule has been consistently enforced for all municipalities.
Total enforcement of the rule means that municipalities must not only disclose their
indexes, but they will be punished if they do not meet the criteria and could come
under the control of the central government.
Fig. 2 presents the new fiscal indexes that measure the degree of municipal
fiscal soundness. In this paper, we call the new four indexes ”targeted indexes”.
The Balance1 Index is the ratio of the fiscal surplus of the ordinary accounts to the
standard financial scale of municipalities as a flow index3.
Balance1 =
fiscal surplus
standard financial scale
(1)
The standard financial scale includes the general revenues of municipalities for
each fiscal year, which consist of standard local tax revenues and local allocation
tax grants (LAT grants) from the central government. An LAT grant is a lump-
sum, unspecific grant for local governments. The number of LAT grants provided
3Balance1 and Balance2 are the real deficit index (Jishitsu Akaji Hiritsu) and the consolidated
real deficit index (Renketsu Jishitsu Akaji Hiritsu), respectively. We multiplied both indexes by -1
to be able to compare them with the former balance index. In this section, we follow the ”White
Paper on Local Public Finance, 2007” that was published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
Communications.
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to each municipality is determined by the central government based on municipal
fiscal shortages for each fiscal year4. The Balance1 Index targets only ordinary
accounts with nearly the same scope as the former fiscal rule.
The Balance2 Index is the ratio of the consolidated fiscal surplus of ordinary
accounts and public enterprise accounts to the standard financial scale of munici-
palities as a flow index.
Balance2 =
consolidated fiscal surplus
standard financial scale
(2)
The Balance2 Index targets ordinary accounts and public enterprise accounts.
Under the former rule, we were only able to check for the bad debt of each public
enterprise. Although municipalities generally manage public enterprises, it was
difficult to confirm the relationship between the ordinary accounts and the public
enterprise accounts.
The Redemption Index is the ratio of the number of redeemed bonds of ordinary
accounts, public enterprise accounts, partial administrative associations, and wide-
area local public bodies to the standard financial scale of the municipality as a flow
index.
Redemption =
redemption of bond
standard financial scale
(3)
The Redemption Index targets ordinary accounts and wide-area local public
bodies and shows how much debt the municipalities must repay each year 5.
However, the Redemption Index is calculated by excluding specific grants from
the numerator of the index. Therefore, if municipalities increase the number of
specific grants they are awarded, they can reduce their Redemption index.
The Future Burden Index is the ratio of the current outstanding balance of the
future burden, including that of the debts of the local general account as well as
other likely future payments, and represents the extent to which finances may be
tight in the future.
Future burden =
future burden
standard financial scale
(4)
The Future Burden Index targets all public sector entities in each municipality.
The numerator of the Future Burden Index consists of the accumulated debts in the
ordinary accounts and the debt burdens of extra-governmental organizations and
includes consolidated fiscal surplus as a stock variable. Thus, if municipalities have
a large debt burden in their third-sector enterprise accounts, their Future Burden
Index increases. However, the Future Burden Index is calculated by excluding
the estimated amount of specific grants and appropriable funds, including reserved
funds and others, from the numerator of the index. Therefore, if municipalities
4For further information on the LAT grant system, see Ihori (2009), Saito and Yunoue (2009),
and Hirota and Yunoue (2017).
5Under the new fiscal rule, if the Redemption Index of a municipality exceeds 18 percent, then
the municipality needs to obtain permission to issue new bonds from the central governmen.
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increase teh amount of their specific grants or decrease their reserved funds, then
they can reduce their Future Burden index.
In addition to the four new indexes, we consider two ”untargeted indexes” in
this paper. First, we define the reserved funds (Funds) index for the repayment of
bonds for each municipality. We use this index because if municipalities decrease teh
amount of their funds or increase their money transfers to hide their fiscal deficits,
they do not receive any punishment from the central government. The Funds Index
is calculated by dividing the total amount of reserved funds (in thousands and using
the Japanese yen as the currency) by the population size6 because municipalities
can improve their Balance1 and Balance2 indexes by reducing the funds reserved
for the repayment of bonds while allowing for an increase in their Future Burden
Index, as this does not include a red card.
Second, we define the Money Transfer Index, which represents money transfers
from ordinary accounts to public enterprise accounts. The Money Transfer Index is
calculated by dividing the total amount of money transfers (in thousands and using
the Japanese yen as the currency) by the population size; this index is the reason
some municipalities shifted their fiscal deficits to their own extra-governmental
organizations such as public enterprise accounts to hide their fiscal deficits under
the former fiscal rule. In addition, money transfers from ordinary accounts to
public enterprise accounts affects the Balance2 and Future Burden Indexes because
if municipalities increase their money transfers, they can pretend to improve their
Balance2 and Future Burden Indexes through a consolidated fiscal surplus.
Fig. 3 presents a diagram of the financial status of local governments. The new
fiscal rule establishes four new indexes and requires local governments to disclose
them completely with the aim of quickly achieving financial soundness or rebuilding.
The four new indexes include a number of financial criteria: for example, if munic-
ipalities have a Balance1 Index ranging from -11.25 and -15 percent, depending on
the financial size of the municipality, they are within the early financial soundness
restoration stage (yellow card) and must improve their fiscal condition indepen-
dently. In this case, municipalities must develop a financial soundness plan that is
approved by their local councils and conduct a mandatory external audit. Addi-
tionally, municipalities must report their implementation progress to local councils
and via public announcements every fiscal year. If the early achievement of finan-
cial soundness is deemed to be very difficult, then the Ministry of Internal Affairs
and Communications or the prefectural governor will make the necessary recom-
mendations. All four indexes include a yellow card.
Moreover, if municipalities have a Balance1 Index that exceeds -20 percent, then
they are within the financial rebuilding stage (red card) and must be fiscally man-
aged under the supervision of the central government. These municipalities must
conduct a thorough financial restructuring with the involvement of the central gov-
ernment. In this case, municipalities must formulate a financial restructuring plan
that must be approved by the local councils; then, they must conduct a mandatory
external audit. Additionally, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
must agree with the municipalities’ financial rebuilding plan. The criteria for the
Balance2, Redemption, and Future Burden Indexes are determined by the new
fiscal rule. Although the Future Burden Index includes a yellow card, where the
6In this paper, the total amount of reserved funds and money transfers are presented in thou-
sands and using the Japanese yen as the currency.
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criterion is 350 percent, it does not include a red card.
3 Empirical framework
3.1 Estimation method
In this section, we identify the causal effects of the new fiscal rule with a focus
on creative accounting and reveal the interdependency of the new fiscal indexes
by applying the SUR-DID method to the data between FY2007 and FY2010. In
particular, we focus on the institutional change between the partial enforcement in
FY2007 and the total enforcement in FY2008 because the partial enforcement of the
new fiscal rule did not include any punishment, even for municipalities exceeding
the criteria of the new fiscal indexes. Some municipalities that suffered from a
previously high Redemption Index or a formerly low Balance Index before the
introduction of the new fiscal rule might manipulate their accounts within the
allowable range of the new fiscal rule.
First, an SUR model can better address the contemporaneous correlations be-
tween the error terms given the interdependency of these indexes than the methods
employed in previous studies. This advantage exists because each index is inter-
dependently determined by each municipality at the same time and because each
municipality must continue watching both the stock and flow indexes to avoid ex-
ceeding each criterion. However, since the Future Burden Index does not include
a red card, municipalities might decide to decrease their Balance1 or Balance2
Indexes while allowing an increase in their Future Burden Index. Municipalities
might also manipulate their accounts within the allowable range of the new fiscal
rule even if most of the indexes improved after the introduction of the new fis-
cal rule. Therefore, we also use both the Funds and Money Transfer Indexes as
outcome variables.
Second, we need to apply a DID method to identify the causal effects of the new
fiscal rule. Naturally, since there were no new fiscal indexes before the introduction
of the new fiscal rule, we cannot compare the new fiscal indexes before and after the
new fiscal rule. We employ the former Redemption Index under the former fiscal
rule as a treatment variable. If the former Redemption Index in FY2006, which
is just before the introduction of the rule in FY2007, is higher than 15 percent,
Treatment equals 1, and zero, otherwise. Under the former Redemption Index,
municipalities whose indexes ranged from 15 percent to 20 percent were called a
caution group but were not punished in any way. However, municipalities whose
indexes were higher 20 percent were called a limitation group and had to obtain
permission from the central government to issue new bonds. By contrast, if the new
Redemption Index is higher than 18 percent, municipalities must obtain permission
from the central government to issue a new bond under the new fiscal rule. The
formulas for the former and new Redemption Indexes are almost identical, but their
targeted accounts are quite different. Because the target of the new Redemption
Index was expanded to include not only ordinary accounts but also public enterprise
accounts and other associations after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, each
municipality must improve the fiscal conditions of public enterprise accounts and
other accounts. Therefore, some municipalities might fiscally adjust their accounts
between ordinary accounts and public enterprise accounts to avoid a reduction in
9
the new Redemption Index. For this reason, we apply the SUR-DID method by
using data between FY2007 and FY2010.
Equation (5) presents an estimation model.
Yijt = β0j + β1,jTreatment ∗ d2008ijt + β2,jTreatment ∗ d2009ijt
+β3,jTreatment ∗ d2010ijt + β3,jXijt + µij + τjt + ϵijt
(5)
where i represents the municipality, j represents the fiscal index, and t repre-
sents the year. The outcome variables, Yijt, consist of Balance1it, Balance2it,
Redemptionit, and FutureBurdenit. We use Fundsit, which represents the funds
reserved per capita for the repayment of bonds in each municipality, as an outcome
variable because municipalities can decrease their Balance1 and Balance2 Indexes
by reducing the amount of funds that is reserved for the repayment of bonds while
allowing their Future Burden Index to increse, which does not include a red card.
In addition, we use MoneyTransferit, which is calculated as the money transfers
from ordinary accounts to public enterprise accounts per capita. β0 is a constant,
and the error terms are ϵijt. We assume that the error terms for each equation
have contemporaneous correlations because of decisions stemming from the fiscal
indexes.
The covariatesXit consist of Popit, Pop15it, Pop65it, LATgrantsit, andMergedtrendit.
Pop15it is the share of the population under the age of 15, and Pop65it is the
share of the population over the age of 65. Mergedtrendit is the number of years
after a municipal merger because the number of municipalities rapidly decreased
through municipal mergers between FY1999 and FY2006. LATgrantsit is a dummy
variable, and t is the time period. We also focus on LATgrantsit, first, because
Japanese municipalities have been highly dependent on certain specific and LAT
grants from the central government for approximately 50 years. Japanese munici-
palities have little right to impose their own local taxes, as the system is centralized.
Most local tax rates are determined by the central government to ensure horizontal
fiscal equity among the municipalities. Therefore, the tax capacity of municipali-
ties depends on their population size or area. The second reason we focus on these
grants is because the new fiscal indexes include the standard financial scale in their
denominators. The standard financial scale consists of ordinary revenues, such as
local tax revenues and LAT grants. The amount of LAT grants provided to each
municipality is determined by the central government based on the municipal fiscal
shortages for each fiscal year. The Japanese local public finance system is practi-
cally centralized and is highly dependent on grants from the central government.
For example, in FY2008, 1647 out of a total of 1788 municipalities received LAT
grants. Municipalities use a single annual budget every year. The expenditures for
each fiscal year must be financed by the revenues received in that fiscal year. If
municipalities do not spend all of their budgets within the fiscal year, then grants
such as LAT grants or specific grants may be reduced in the subsequent fiscal year.
The public project expenditures of some municipalities have a tendency to increase
at the end of each fiscal year. Thus, when municipalities receive larger LAT grants
than usual, their new fiscal indexes may decrease. Moreover, the numerators of the
Redemption and Future Burden Indexes are calculated by eliminating the amount
of revenue from specific grants. Thus, we must consider the effects of LAT grants
on the new fiscal indexes in our estimation.
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The Citysizeit dummy variables consist of an ordinance-designated cities dummy,
a core cities dummy, a special case cities dummy, and a cities dummy. Because these
cities provide different types of public services depending on their size, we must con-
sider city size in our estimation. Specifically, for ordinance-designated cities, the
Future Burden Index criterion, which has a yellow card, is 400 percent, while for
other cities, it is 350 percent.
3.2 Data and summary statistics
In the SUR-DID model, we use Japanese municipal data from FY2007 to FY2010
because the new fiscal rule has been in force since FY20077. The data on municipal
governments are derived primarily from the Shi Cyo Son Kessan Jyokyo (Statistics
of the Final Accounts of Municipal Governments), the Zaisei Jyokyo tou Ichiran
hyo (Municipal Financial Situation List) and the Gappei Digital Archive (Digital
Archive of Municipal Mergers).
The summary statistics are reported in Table 1. The number of municipalities
in the treatment and control groups between FY2007 and FY2010 is 572 and 4554,
respectively. We excluded the data for Yubari city in our estimation because Yubari
city went practically bankrupt before the introduction of the new fiscal rule8. Since
we include municipalities whose former Redemption Indexes were higher than 15
percent just before the introduction of the new fiscal rule, the outcome variables of
the treatment group are comparatively worse than those of the control group. On
average, there are almost no differences in our covariates.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Estimation results using an SUR-DID model
Table 2 shows the results of the estimation using the SUR-DID method for the
period from FY2007 to FY2010. Given the results of the Breusch-Pagan test of
estimation models (1) and (2), which are shown in Table 2, we reject the hypothesis
that the error term correlations are zero for the study period. The error terms are
correlated for each equation, indicating that we can achieve more effective statistical
results with an SUR model than with an OLS model. The results show that these
fiscal indexes are independently decided by each municipality at the same time. We
reveal that it is much better to apply an SUR model to consider the effects of the
new fiscal rule applied in Japan rather than using the methods used in previous
studies.
As a benchmark, estimation model (1) in Table 2 reports the SUR-DID model
without covariates. Almost all treatment variables are statistically significant for
each outcome variable. For both the Balance1 and Balance2 indexes, the treatment
variables for each year are positive and significant. The treatment variables of
the Redemption and Future Burden Indexes are negative and significant. The
7To properly evaluate the effects of the new fiscal rule, we did not use data after FY2010
because a number of municipalities were severely damaged by the Great East Japan Earthquake
that occurred on 11 March 2011. In the following years, these municipalities received many types
of support, including a large number of special grants issued by the central government and others.
Therefore, in this paper, we exclude data after FY2010 to avoid the effects of the earthquake.
8The future Burden Index of Yubari city was higher than 1,000 percent for a few years.
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treatment variables of the Funds Index are positive and significant. Thus, it appears
that municipalities improve their fiscal conditions without stock-flow adjustments
after the introduction of the new fiscal rule, and the new fiscal rule is very effective.
However, the treatment variables for money transfers from ordinary accounts to
public enterprise accounts are statistically positive and significant at standard levels
each year. These results should be interpreted with caution because there are fiscal
adjustments between accounts to avoid exceeding the criterion of the new fiscal
index relating to public enterprise accounts.
Estimation model (2), which is shown in Table 2, reports the results from the
SUR-DID model with covariates. For the Balance1 Index, the treatment variables
each year are statistically positive and significant. The average treatment effects on
the treated (ATT) variables of the Balance1 Index are 0.663, 1.055, and 1.616 from
FY2008 to FY2010, respectively. The ordinary accounts of municipalities have im-
proved after the introduction of the new fiscal rule. The population size coefficients
are significant with negative signs. The merger coefficient is significant with a neg-
ative sign. Merged municipalities generally improve their fiscal deficits following
municipal mergers. The LAT grants coefficient is significant with a positive sign,
that is, the Balance1 Index of municipalities that receive grants from the central
government is large. Of the city size dummy variables, those for core cities, special
case cities, and cities are significant with negative signs, while the dummy variable
for designated cities is not significant.
The results of the Balance2 Index have a tendency similar to those of the Bal-
ance1. The treatment variables for each year are also statistically positive and sig-
nificant. The ATTs of the Balance2 Index are 1.263, 2.183, and 2.635 from FY2008
to FY2010, respectively. These figures are higher than those for the Balance1 Index
each year. The results indicate that the municipalities show more improvement in
the fiscal conditions of public enterprises than in those of their ordinary accounts.
The coefficients of population size and mergers are negative and significant. The
coefficient for LAT grants is significant with a positive sign for the Balance2 Index
as well as for the Balance1 index. Additionally, it is natural that the coefficient for
the LAT grants has a positive sign because the denominators of the Balance1 and
Balance2 indexes include the standard financial scale, which includes both local tax
revenues and LAT grants.
For the Redemption Index, the treatment variables for FY2009 and FY2010
are statistically negative and significant. The ATTs of the Redemption Index are
-1.014, and -2.003 in FY2009 and FY2010, respectively. Municipalities improve
their Redemption Index except for a settlement that occurred in FY2008 just after
the introduction of the new fiscal rule. The merger coefficient is significant with a
negative sign. The merged municipalities decrease their Redemption Indexes. The
LAT grants coefficient is significant with a negative sign. Therefore, municipalities
that receive LAT grants reduce the redemption of their accumulated debts. Of the
city size dummy variables, those for designated cities, core cities, special case cities,
and cities are positive and significant. Municipalities of a comparatively large size
increase their redemption.
For the Future Burden Index, the treatment variables each year are statistically
negative and significant. The ATTs of the Future Burden Index are -5.712, -16.413,
and -24.656 from FY2008 to FY2010, respectively. Municipalities improve their fu-
ture burden as well as other new fiscal indexes. The merger coefficient is significant
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with a negative sign. The LAT grant coefficient is significant with a negative sign.
Therefore, because municipalities depend on LAT grants from the central govern-
ment, they have a lower Future Burden Index than others. In addition, of the city
size dummy variables, those for ordinance-designated cities, core cities, special case
cities, and cities are significant with positive signs. Large municipalities increase
their future burden through activities such as accumulating debts.
Given the results for the new fiscal indexes, we now consider the estimation re-
sult of the Funds and Money Transfer Indexes. For the Funds Index, the treatment
variables for FY2009 and FY2010 are statistically positive and significant. The
ATTs of the Funds Index are 21.392 and 43.756 for FY2009 and FY2010, respec-
tively. In other words, the ATTs are 210 and 440 dollars per capita at an exchange
rate of 100 Japanese yen to one U.S. dollar. The coefficients of the share of popula-
tion under the age of 15 and over the age of 65 are negative and significant. These
results show that municipalities, which are facing a declining birth rate and an
aging population, avoid exceeding the criteria of the new fiscal rule by drawing on
their savings. The merger coefficient is significant with a positive sign. For the city
size dummy variables, we can see different results for the four new fiscal indexes.
We reveal that the coefficients for the ordinance-designated cities, core cities, spe-
cial case cities, and cities are significant with negative signs, indicating that these
large cities avoid exceeding the criteria of the new fiscal indexes by reducing their
reserve funds. As a result, their Future Burden Indexes increase, while their Funds
Index decreases. Because larger municipalities are drawing on their reserved funds
to repay their bonds in the future, it cannot be said that they achieve true fiscal
soundness.
For the Money Transfer Index, the treatment variables for each year are statis-
tically positive and significant. The ATTs of the Money Transfer Index are 3.999,
8.270, and 8.645 from FY2008 to FY2010, respectively. In other words, these ATTs
are 40, 83 and 87 dollars per capita at an exchange rate of 100 Japanese yen to
the U.S. dollar. Interestingly, we clearly reveal that municipalities that suffer from
a high former Redemption Index engage in creative accounting through fiscal ad-
justments to address the criterion of the new fiscal index under the new fiscal rule,
especially for public enterprise accounts. In addition, the merger coefficient is pos-
itive and significant. The dummy variables for core cities and cities are negative
and significant. These cities have decreased their money transfers from ordinary
accounts to public enterprise accounts.
4.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we conduct robustness and validity checks by formally testing for
the common pre-trend assumption for our main outcomes of interest using both
placebo outcome variables and placebo treatment periods. Not surprisingly, we
cannot see the new fiscal indexes before the introduction of the new fiscal rule. To
check the common trends assumption between the treatment and control groups in
the pre-treatment period, we apply the former Balance, Funds, and Money Transfer
Indexes as placebo outcome variables. For this reason, the former Balance Index is
almost same as the Balance1 Index.
Fig. 4 shows the trends of the former Balance, Funds, and Money Transfer
Indexes both before and after the introduction of the new fiscal rule. There is
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no change in these indexes between the treatment and control groups in the pre-
treatment period, but the treatment group rapidly increases its Balance Index after
the partial enforcement of the new fiscal rule. Although the former Balance Index
of the control group is approximately 5 percent before and after the introduction
of the new fiscal rule, its representation in the treatment group clearly increases
from approximately 3 percent in FY2007 to 6 percent in FY2010. The Funds
Index gradually increases after the introduction of the new fiscal rule. The Funds
Index of the treatment group increases from approximately 240 in FY2007 to 340
in FY2010. In addition, the Money Transfer Index rapidly increases after FY2007.
By analyzing the graphical results for this period, we find the common pre-trend
assumption using the DID method.
Next, Table 3 reports the estimation results for the placebo treatment periods.
To analyze the placebo treatments, we use only 2 control and 2 treatment period
years, which includes the data between FY2004 and FY2005. The placebo SUR-
DID estimation with control variables can statistically confirm the common pre-
trend assumption. We observe that the treatment variables of the former Balance,
Funds, and Money Transfer Indexes are statistically nonsignificant. This result is
not surprising given the trends we find in Fig. 4.
As with these results, our main results in Table 2 are consistent with creative
accounting by fiscal adjustments under the new fiscal rule. Thus, the treatment
group, which faces a large former Redemption Index, engaged in creative accounting
by using money transfers from ordinary accounts to public enterprise accounts after
the introduction of the new fiscal rule.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We analyze whether cre-
ative accounting occurred after the introduction of a new fiscal rule in Japanese
municipalities. In particular, we focus on the institutional changes that occurred
between partial and total enforcement. Our primary contribution is that we identify
the causal effects of the new fiscal rule on creative accounting by focusing on fiscal
adjustments. In addition, we reveal the interdependency of the new fiscal indexes
after the introduction of a new fiscal rule by applying the SUR-DID method.
We find that the new fiscal indexes of the new fiscal rule are interdependent.
Each municipality independently determines its new fiscal indexes at the same time.
Thus, we have to consider the interdependency between stock and flow indexes to
reveal the effects of the new Japanese fiscal rule. Our results appear to indicate
that Japan’s new fiscal rule is effective because, on average, municipalities improve
all four of the new indexes. That is, the ”targeted indexes” are improved after the
new four indexes.
However, we clearly find that municipalities improve these new indexes by in-
creasing their money transfers from ordinary accounts to public enterprise accounts.
This result shows that one of the ”untargeted indexes” becomes worse to improve
their ”targeted indexes” just after the new fiscal rule was introduced. The munic-
ipalities can do this without consequences because money transfers do not have a
corresponding criterion in the new fiscal rule. Municipalities that had a large former
Redemption Index just before the introduction of the new fiscal rule can now ma-
nipulate their fiscal indexes through money transfers if they have large accumulated
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debts that are related to the operation of public enterprises. Therefore, we find that
under the new rule, municipalities implement creative accounting through fiscal ad-
justments. By contrast, large municipalities, which include ordinance-designated
cities, core cities, special case cities, and cities, reduce their reserved funds to lev-
els that are below the criterion of the yellow card. These municipalities engage in
creative accounting by reducing their reserved funds to avoid exceeding the criteria
established for their indexes.
We believe that municipalities myopically postpone improving their fiscal prob-
lems even though the aim of introducing the new fiscal rule was to achieve true
fiscal soundness and prevent creative accounting such as fiscal adjustments. Given
that a number of municipalities depend on grants from the central government
and that they have a large amount of accumulated debt, we conclude that munic-
ipalities engage in creative accounting by increasing money transfers, and larger
municipalities reduce their reserved funds. These municipalities do so because they
do not want to be fiscally managed and overseen by the central government. Fur-
thermore, these findings demonstrate that municipalities postpone improving their
actual fiscal condition.
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Figure 1: Timeline for the introduction of the new fiscal rule
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Figure 2: Subject of the ratio for determining soundness
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Figure 3: Image of the early financial soundness, financial rebuilding and soundness
of public enterprise management
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Figure 4: Former balance, funds, and money transfers
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Treatment Control
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Number of observations 572 4554
Outcome variables
Balance1 4.881 5.153 5.176 3.418
Balance2 12.589 11.359 16.105 11.314
Redemption 18.350 4.247 12.723 4.601
Future burden 114.346 91.726 70.478 81.195
Funds (thousand yen per capita) 290.908 528.208 210.757 387.470
Money transfers (thousand yen per capita) 87.273 56.502 64.565 41.365
Covariates
Pop 65587 240310 66050 164989
Pop. 15 0.120 0.025 0.130 0.024
Pop. 65 0.276 0.079 0.241 0.075
Merged trend 1.801 2.648 1.776 2.666
LAT grants dummy 0.979 0.143 0.930 0.255
Designated cities 0.030 0.170 0.007 0.086
Core cities 0.007 0.083 0.023 0.151
Special case cities 0.000 0.000 0.024 0.154
Cities 0.316 0.465 0.394 0.489
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Table 2: Estimation results of SUR-DID
(1)
Outcome variables
Balance1 Balance2 Redemption Future Burden Funds Money Transfer
Treatment*2008 0.747*** 1.308*** -0.114 -7.455*** 7.600 4.327**
(0.200) (0.411) (0.126) (2.043) (6.748) (1.956)
Treatment*2009 1.107*** 2.220*** -1.056*** -17.582*** 26.292*** 8.591***
(0.203) (0.417) (0.127) (2.072) (6.845) (1.984)
Treatment*2010 1.657*** 2.653*** -2.039*** -25.566*** 48.716*** 8.948***
(0.203) (0.417) (0.127) (2.073) (6.846) (1.984)
2009 0.610*** 0.512*** -0.658*** -11.892*** 14.780*** 3.000***
(0.095) (0.195) (0.060) (0.970) (3.203) (0.928)
2010 1.299*** 1.478*** -1.625*** -28.796*** 44.963*** 3.939***
(0.095) (0.195) (0.060) (0.971) (3.206) (0.929)
Constant 0.005 0.395*** -0.275*** -10.290*** 9.090*** 1.807***
(0.066) (0.136) (0.042) (0.677) (2.238) (0.649)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(15) = 3391.586 ***
Observations 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131
R-squared 0.065 0.030 0.215 0.212 0.063 0.014
23
Table 2: (continued) Estimation results of SUR-DID model
(2)
Outcome variables
Balance1 Balance2 Redemption Future Burden Funds Money Transfer
Treatment*2008 0.663*** 1.263*** -0.061 -5.712*** 0.761 3.999**
(0.201) (0.409) (0.126) (2.029) (6.618) (1.957)
Treatment*2009 1.055*** 2.183*** -1.014*** -16.413*** 21.392*** 8.270***
(0.203) (0.415) (0.126) (2.036) (6.644) (1.985)
Treatment*2010 1.616*** 2.635*** -2.003*** -24.656*** 43.756*** 8.645***
(0.202) (0.414) (0.126) (2.035) (6.643) (1.984)
Pop -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Pop. 15 -6.365 -589.445***
(6.423) (116.091)
Pop. 65 -1.420 0.283 22.259 -90.760*
(1.377) (0.947) (15.425) (53.287)
Merged years -0.029* -0.220*** -0.039*** -0.551*** 1.111** 0.511***
(0.015) (0.029) (0.010) (0.154) (0.510) (0.152)
LAT grants dummy 0.367** 0.680** -0.284*** -10.711*** 0.779 0.580
(0.157) (0.317) (0.096) (1.553) (5.137) (1.525)
Designated cities -0.517 1.222*** 18.978*** -43.595*** -3.779
(0.397) (0.233) (3.748) (14.656) (4.437)
Core cities -0.705*** 0.757*** 13.038*** -45.086*** -4.436*
(0.226) (0.162) (2.603) (8.522) (2.532)
Special case cities -0.413* 0.536*** 4.491* -42.627*** -3.988
(0.224) (0.161) (2.587) (8.466) (2.513)
Cities -0.311*** 0.370*** 8.664*** -38.672*** -2.649***
(0.074) (0.053) (0.852) (2.775) (0.811)
2009 0.737*** 0.587*** -0.668*** -13.552*** 22.977*** 2.820***
(0.150) (0.194) (0.100) (1.619) (5.441) (0.927)
2010 1.420*** 1.570*** -1.613*** -29.951*** 51.711*** 3.545***
(0.156) (0.195) (0.104) (1.687) (5.764) (0.933)
Constant -0.240 0.065 -0.124 -2.062 15.564** 1.799
(0.181) (0.316) (0.116) (1.870) (6.182) (1.570)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(15) = 3247.657***
Observations 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131 5,131
R-squared 0.071 0.043 0.232 0.244 0.121 0.019
Note: The models in the table include year and municipality fixed effects. Standard
errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1,
5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 3: Placebo treatments for the former balance, funds, and money transfers
Outcome variables
Former Balance Funds Money Transfer
Treatment 0.014 0.701 0.739
(0.071) (1.221) (0.488)
Constant 0.742*** 18.802*** -2.636***
(0.176) (2.939) (1.014)
Covariates Yes Yes Yes
FE Yes Yes Yes
Breusch-Pagan test chi2(3) = 138.130 ***
Observations 4,339 4,339 4,339
R-squared 0.008 0.013 0.009
Note: The models in the table use two years of data from FY2004 to FY2005.
The models include year, municipality fixed effects and the following covariates:
population, ratio of the population under 15 years old to the total population, ratio
of population over 65 years old to the total population, merged years, LAT grants,
designated cities, core cities, special case cities, and cities. Standard errors are
reported in brackets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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